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The Navy's primary mission is combat warfare in the defense of our
country. The tactical competence of the Navy's line officer is directly
related to the achievement of its mission.
Improving tactical readiness was an issue discussed in meetings
held in November and December 1981 attended by the Fleet CINC's, Type
Commanders, numbered Fleet Commanders, and other principal operational
commanders concerned with tactical development and training. Numerous
suggestions for improving tactical readiness and training were proposed
to the Chief of Naval Operations during the discussions following the
November and December meetings.
In May of 1982, as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward U.S.N, identified one of the major needs of the Navy as
improving the tactical proficiency of the fleet. Admiral Hayward had
desired to implement a tactics test for Naval Officers. It was
Admiral Hayward 's intention that the examination on Naval Tactics be
required for officers who had been selected for promotion and that the
test must be passed before a promotion could occur. The examination
was not to influence the process for selecting an officer for promotion,
but rather was to be a requirement of a selected officer. At that
time it was not determined if the exam would be administered to only
line officers or if the examined group would also include Staff Corps
Officers (Medical, Dental, Judge Advocate General, Medical Services,
Nurse, Supply, Chaplain, Civil Engineer Corps) [Bush, 1982: p. 1] .
9

As a result of recent meetings, the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations has directed that a survey be conducted to determine how
line officers divide their time between various responsibilities.
Pretesting of the survey requested has been recently completed by this
author. The survey vehicle was designed by the author and CDR Martin
Newman USN. The final vehicle, or parent vehicle, is presently being
administered by Dr. Robert Morrison, together with CDR Newman, of the
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California.
The pretest vehicle was administered randomly to five hundred (500) Air
Warfare Officers. The objective of the pretest survey as well as the
parent vehicle is to achieve insight into factors which Naval Officers
in operational billets perceive as enhancing or constraining their
opportunity to learn and practice tactical employment of their weapons
and combat systems.
The pretest survey vehicle consisted of 202 close-ended questions
and was self administered to Naval Aviators assigned to ships, sub-
marines, aircraft squadrons, and afloat staffs. The parent vehicle
consists of 172 questions, is self-administerable, and has been distri-
buted to 4000 Naval Officers of various designators, all assigned to
operational billets. Survey design, methodology, computer programs
written for analyses, feedback comments received on attached comment
sheets, and preliminary results have been published in a recent Tech-
nical Report titled Tactical Competency Survey, PRETEST Data Base
[Drogowski, 1983].
In order to enhance the tactical knowledge of Naval Officers, it
will be necessary for the Department of the Navy not only to clearly
define its goals and objectives in this area but also to specify the
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level of tactical competence required in the planned tactics exam. The
opportunity to become and remain tactically competent to the level
prescribed will require the Navy to provide Naval Officers direction,
guidance, time, and training. Training in the form of formal education,
Fleet, Battle Group, Squadron, and Unit-level exercises, as well as
individual self-study, are only a few ways for individuals to further
their present level of tactical competency.
The Navy will need to determine its goals and objectives in this
area before it can train and evaluate individuals in Tactical Compe-
tency. It will be necessary to instill in both the individuals and
their respective commands a sense of priority for the tasks and func-
tions involved. Unless special care is exercised, delegation of
responsibilities for these tasks and functions may lead to problems
of Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study is to conduct empirical research on
role conflict and role ambiguity in a military organizational environ-
ment. Analysis will be performed on a segment of data obtained from the
previously discussed pretest survey titled Tactical Competency Survey.
Presently the terms Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict tend to be used
interchangeably in everyday conversation, and this use tends also to
occur in published articles. It is therefore essential for the purpose
of this study to distinguish between the two terms. The following
definitions, provided by Katz and Kahn [1978], will apply throughout
this study.
We define ROLE CONFLICT as the simultaneous occurrence of two or
more role expectations such that compliance with one would make
the other more difficult or impossible. [Katz and Kahn, 1978: p. 204]
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In the prototypical form, ROLE AMBIGUITY simply means uncertainty
about what the occupant of a particular office is supposed to do.
But there may be uncertainty as well about many other aspects of
a role, including the membership of the role-set, the ends to be
served, the role enactment, and evaluation of present role behavior.
[Katz and Kahn, 1978: p. 206]
The analyses completed in this study will be discussed in depth in
Chapter V. A review of the literature on Role Ambiguity and Role Con-
flict precedes this discussion.
12

II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one
and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise
the other. [Matthew 6:24]
A. ROLES
1. Multiple Roles
The concept of multiple roles is a phenomenon in which an
individual is normally in only one active role at a particular time,
while other roles are in a relative degree of latency. Multiple roles
relate to multiple positions which the individual may hold in various
organizations. Quite often the individual holds these positions, per-
haps of authority, in various organizational and institutional settings
concurrently. Within each of these organizations, the individual occu-
pies a particular position and thereby performs certain defined role
activities associated with that position. The individual's role exis-
tence varies in complexity in accordance with the number of roles he
plays in the different organizations, as well as with the amount of
authority and power associated with each position he holds.
2. Role Sets
It is important to have a clear understanding of the difference
between the concept of multiple roles and that of role sets. The
former, multiple roles, refers to the different roles in different
organizational settings. Role Set, on the other hand, relates to any
of various orientations that a specific position in a particular organi-
zation may require. The position held by a Commanding Officer of a
Naval Command offers an excellent example of role set. He is an
13

individual within a single command who is administrator, comptroller,
legislator, and authoritarian. Multiple roles can be illustrated by
looking at the same individual, but from the perspective of his
involvement external to his immediate command—for instance, the posi-
tions held by the individual in church and civic organizations.
3. Role Perception
The accuracy of Role Perception regarding a task to be performed
could have a definite impact on organizational effectiveness and effi-
ciency. In their book, Organization and Management , Kast And Rosenzweig
[1970] discuss role perception in detail. They provide the following
insight into the area.
Individuals have certain abilities and are motivated in varying
degrees to perform various tasks. However, if a task is incorrectly
perceived, the results may be quite ineffective from the organiza-
tional point of view. On the other hand, an activity or role asso-
ciated with a particular position could be perceived quite accurately
and yet inefficient performance could result because of deficiencies
in ability and/or motivation. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 262]
B. CONFLICT
The term role refers to the behavior associated with a particular
position. The expectation of behavior can be written or unwritten
within an organization. A favorable working environment yielding
favorable results, harmony, and a reduction in conflict is possible if
all individuals within an organization understand, or are made aware
of, their "legitimate" accepted behavior. When role demands in the
form of behavior, task-completion priority, and task understanding is
left to doubt, conflict will arise. Conflict in this sense does not
mean overt antagonism or violence. It involves the possible simulta-
neous and not necessarily continuous occurrence of two or more
14

role-sendings such that the compliance with one precludes compliance
with the others. Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn suggest throughout
their works that an individual will experience role conflict when he or
she is confronted with two or more incompatible demands.
1. Types of Role Conflict
Referring to detailed studies Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, and
Rosenthal in their book, Organizational Stress: Studies in Role
Conflict and Ambiguity , Kahn [1964], identify six types of Role
Conflict: Intrasender conflict, Intersender conflict, Inter-role
conflict, Person-role conflict, Role overload, and Role ambiguity.
Stoner [1978] provides a clear description and example of the six types
of role conflict identified by Kahn et al_ [1964].
INTRASENDER CONFLICT occurs when a single supervisor presents a
subordinate with an incompatible set of orders or expectations.
For example, a division manager orders a purchasing agent to
buy materials immediately at a price that requires prior home
office authorization, and then warns the agent not to violate
the rulebook regulations.
INTERSENDER CONFLICT arises when orders or expectations of a
person or group clash with expectations or orders from other
persons or groups. This can occur, for example, when a supervisor
orders a foreman to engage in tighter supervision, while the
work crew makes clear that any attempt to comply with this order
will lead to serious trouble in the ranks.
INTER-ROLE CONFLICT occurs when the different roles played by
the same person give rise to conflict demands. In his roles as
husband and father, for example, a man may be pressed to be home
with his family in the evening and on weekends. But in his role
as a loyal worker, the same man may have to put in a considerable
amount of overtime to get his work done. This particular example
of inter-role conflict is extremely common and often creates great
tension both on the job and at home.
PERSON-ROLE CONFLICT occurs when on the job role requirements run
counter to the individual's needs or values. An executive ordered
to bribe a domestic or foreign official, for example, might find
the assignment completely antithetical to his or her moral values.
Yet his or her desire for career success might make refusal to
carry out the order difficult.
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In ROLE-OVERLOAD CONFLICT, the individual is confronted with orders
and expectations from a number of sources that cannot be completed
within the given time and quality limits. Should quality be sacri-
ficed in the interest of time? Should some tasks be carried out and
others ignored? If so, which tasks should get priority? Dilemmas
like these are a constant part of a manager's job.
ROLE AMBIGUITY occurs when an individual is provided insufficient
or unclear information about his or her responsibilities. The
individual is therefore uncertain about what he or she is "supposed"
to do. Role ambiguity is often experienced by new managers who are
given a set of duties and responsibilities without being told exactly
how to carry them out. The stress experienced by an individual in
such a situation can be considerable. [Stoner, 1978: pp. 536-538]
Kast and Rosenzweig [1970], in the book entitled Organization and
Management , defined four (4) types of role conflict as Person-Role,
Interrole, Intersender, and Intrasender. The following is provided to
enhance the clarity of the concepts of role conflict and role ambiguity
Four types of role conflict can be identified: (1) person-role,
(2) interrole, (3) intersender, and (4) intrasender. As indicated
previously, the concept of PERSON-ROLE CONFLICT is implied where
personal attributes mediate between the sent role and that which is
received by the focal person. Conflict occurs when the requirements
of the role violate the needs, values, or capacities of the focal
person.
INTERROLE CONFLICT relates to the phenomenon of multiple goals for
individuals simultaneously acting in several or many organizations.
A person may find hemself faced with sent expectations for a role
in one organization which conflict with those for another role.
[Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 266]
INTERSENDER CONFLICT results when various members of the role set
have different expectations for a particular role person and hence
transmit sendings which are conflicting. In this case, there are
pressures on an individual from many directions as the various
senders attempt to influence his behavior.
INTRASENDER CONFLICT develops when one sender transmits conflicting
instructions or expects behavior which is impossible in the light
of earlier directives. Intrasender conflict can occur with the
transmission of messages which have conflicting parts. It is more
common, however, for the conflict to arise from messages sent at
different time periods. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 267]
One other type of role conflict should be mentioned—that of OVERLOAD
In many organizations, the expectations of various senders with
regard to a particular position may not necessarily conflict.
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However, there may be so many of them that it is impossible for one
individual to fulfill the requirements. In a sense, this creates a
conflict between the expectations of the role and the individual's
capacity to perform. Unless the focal person can establish a prior-
ity system or ignore some demands, he may "fall apart at the seams"
or become ineffective in all his actions. Overload role conflict
may be temporary if the various pressures are reduced over time.
On the other hand, they may persist for an indefinite length of
time and hence require more than ad hoc adjustments on the part of
the focal person. [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1970: p. 268]
As noted by the researchers just quoted, role ambiguity is one form
of role conflict. Normally researchers on this subject tend to con-
solidate the five types of role conflict into a single group and refer
to it as "Role Conflict" and then to deal separately with "Role Ambi-
guity". Since the majority of the literature reviewed by the author
of this Thesis discusses role conflict and role ambiguity as separate
entities, the two terms, role conflict and role ambiguity, will be
treated as if they are separate and distinguishable entities in this
study.
2. Effects of Role Conflict and Role Ambiguity
A great many articles have been written recently on the effects
of role conflict and role ambiguity on the organizations and individuals
The central theme throughout these articles is that the overall effects
of role conflict and role ambiguity are adverse. The following quota-
tions are typical of those found in the literature describing the
effects of these two conditions on organizations and on individuals
within organizations:
Role conflict was negatively correlated with job satisfaction and
positively correlated with job threat and anxiety. [Tosi, 1971:
p. 17]
Moreover, role conflicts tend to reduce one's general satisfaction
with the job and the conditions surrounding it, and to undermine
one's confidence in his superiors and in the organization as a whole.
[Kahn, et al
.
, 1964: p. 64]
17

The presence of conflicting and/or ambiguous pressures is considered
to indicate a level of organizational stress. Both role conflicts
and role ambiguity have been demonstrated to be related negatively
to role behavior of the focal person. [Tosi , 1971: pp. 8-9]
Cohen concluded that ambiguity of the situation and inconsistency
of direction raised the anxiety of subordinates, caused a less favor-
able attitude towards supervision, and lowered productivity. [Tosi
,
1971: p. 10]
The nagative effects of role conflict and ambiguity as noted by
Tosi [1971], Kahn [1964], and others apply to the physical well-being
of individuals as well as the organization. Tosi continues:
Responses to role pressures may take the form of behavior, affective
reactions, and/or physiological symptoms. The specific nature of
the response is a function of the role pressure as affected by the
inter-personal relations and the personal attributes of the focal
person. When the sent role pressures are clearly understood and
there are no inconsistencies with other role demands, there will be
few problems. However, the existence of role conflict and role
ambiguity could pose problems for the individual and the organizations.
[Tosi, 1971: p. 9]
In 1957 an experimental study was completed by Smith in which he
measured the effects of role ambiguity on the problem solving ability
of one hundred and forty (140) college students. The results as reported
by Rizzo, et al . [1970] were that:
(1) when groups were asked to solve problems without clarification
of the role each member was to perform their efficiency was signi-
ficantly less than when the roles were made clear; (2) role ambi-
guity markedly reduced group satisfaction with the experience; and
(3) the hostility level was significantly higher for groups under
condition of role ambiguity as compared to control groups. [Rizzo,
et al., 1970: p. 154]
Scott, Mitchell and Birnbaum [1981] recently stated in a discussion
of role ambiguity:
The overall picture is that ambiguity makes it harder for us to do
our jobs. We prefer certainty, ... it should be obvious that what-
leads-to-what are unclear. This is a yery unpleasant situation for
most employees. [Scott, et al
.
, 1981: p. 105]
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Role ambiguity is often a problem for new managers who are assigned
a set of duties but are not clearly told how to execute the duties
Stoner [1978] notes. He adds that:
The stress experienced by the individuals in such a situation can
be considerable. [Stoner, 1978: p. 538]
Scott et al_. [1981] in the following passage presents an even more
ominous picture of the problem of role ambiguity:
Research shows ambiguity leads to greater stress and tension and
lower satisfaction and self-esteem. Some data from medical research
shows that ambiguity may increase heart problems, and leads to anxi-
ety and depression. Finally some studies with more "hard" data
suggest that turnover is greater and productivity lower when role
ambiguity exists. [Scott et al
.
, 1981: p. 105]
Kahn et al_. [1964] states
In the extreme form, conflict and ambiguity pose for the individual
an almost insurmountable problem Conditions of conflict and
ambiguity, therefore, are not merely irritating; in persistent and




Some people experience a rather marked sense of futility when con-
fronted with conflicts. A loss of self-esteem is often apparent.
Others show symptoms of acute anxiety, and of confusion and inde-
cision, which may leave them immobilized for a time. And for a few,
symptoms of hysteria and psychosomatic disorders seem to be connected
to tensions engendered by conflicts. [Kahn et al
.
, 1964: p. 67]
3. Effects of Conflict and Ambiguity on Job Satisfaction
The majority of the literature reviewed so far demonstrates the
adverse effects of role conflict and role ambiguity. One inconsistency
was found, however; some research indicates that role conflict and role
ambiguity are not always negatively related to job satisfaction. The
following statement by Schuler [1975] provides a summary of these
findings:
Tosi and Tosi [1970] and Tosi [1971] found that role conflict and
job satisfaction were negatively related, but they found no rela-
tionship between role ambiguity and job satisfaction. Rizzo et al
.
[1970], House and Rizzo [1972], and Hammer and Tosi [1974] found
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significant negative relationships between job satisfaction and role
ambiguity but no relationship between job satisfaction and role
conflict. [Schuler, 1975: p. 683]
4. Ways of Minimizing Role Conflict
In reducing conflict to an acceptable level, conflicting
demands must be somehow eliminated. Tosi and Carroll [1976] offer the
following three arguments for the reduction of role conflict.
ELIMINATE AUTHORITY OVERLAPS. An authority overlap occurs when two
superiors have the formally designated right to dictate subordinate
actions in the same area. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]
CLARIFY AUTHORITY RELATIONSHIPS. Often a person experiences role
conflict because he is not sure who has authority, and he responds
to another who is in higher position but outside his chain of command
simply because of the other's status. By increasing the person's
awareness of those to whom he should, or must, respond, some conflict
might be reduced. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]
INSURE THAT SUPERVISORS MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE HIERARCHY.
This solution of course is related to clarifying authority relation-
ships. The "territorial" imperative here for a manager should be
not to allow intrusion by other managers outside the chain of command,
unless appropriate. Whether or not an intrusion is appropriate is
organizationally defined. [Tosi and Carroll, 1976: p. 372]
5. Ways to Reduce Role Ambiguity
In order to reduce role ambiguity, it is necessary to take two
related steps according to Tosi and Carroll [1976].
DEFINE BEHAVIORAL AND OUTPUT REQUIREMENTS. Installing a management
by objectives program is one approach for clarifying performance
expectations, because the superior and the subordinate together
determine the means of accomplishing the desired end results.
REWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT. When the individual has been successful
,
the organizational reward system must be used to recognize it.
Managers will thus communicate to subordinates what to do and what
is important not only with words, but also through action. This
will keep the level of role ambiguity low. [Tosi and Carroll,
1976: p. 373]
This study will seek to determine if role conflict and role ambiguity
presently exist within the confines of normal task completion by Naval
Aviators, that is, within an environment of peace-time, where emphasis
20

shifts from fighting ability to administrative peace-time activities.
If the Navy, defined here to be higher authority, sees peace time acti-
vities, such as administrative tasks, as being of a greater priority
than war fighting tasks, such as tactical development, and the indi-
vidual or command does not agree with the ranking of those tasks, role
conflict exists as defined by the literature reviewed. Role ambiguity,
on the other hand, will exist if the priorities are found to be unclear
and/or do not lend themselves to differentiation. Chapter III, which
follows, very briefly summarizes the survey vehicle used during the
pretest phase as discussed in the Introduction. A brief review of the
section used for analyses in this study is also included. In-depth
review of the entire survey is possibly by referring to a published
Technical Report, [Drogowski , 1983, Appendix C],
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III. PREVIOUS METHODOLOGY USED
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a brief
background of the survey vehicle used for gathering the data used in
this study.
B. THE INSTRUMENT
Designed in late December 1982 and early January 1983 and titled
"Tactical Competency Survey", the vehicle consisted of a two-page cover
letter, two pages of instructions, a booklet of 202 questions, and a
comment sheet to provide open-ended feedback. Although the question-
naire was developed to measure perceptions of Naval Officers in opera-
tional billets in the areas of Workload, Feedback Process, Communica-
tions, Time Distribution, Peer and Self Evaluation, Stress, and Resource
Availability, it lends itself also to other areas of research. Span
of Control, Organizational Behavior, Motivation, and Differentiation
of Roles are only a few areas of possible additional research. By
design, the questionnaire was broken down into six divisions: Back-
ground, Training, Workload, Organization, Resources, and Comments.
It is within the second part, Training, that it is possible to extract
questions pertaining to task comparison as analyzed in the current study.
According to the Technical Report describing the survey instrument,
five task areas are compared by the respondent.
Scale ordering in the form of task comparisons of five specific tasks
is completed by the individual. The task areas--Tactics, General
Administration, Personnel and Navy Programs, Systems Technical Know-
ledge, and Officer Professional Qualif ication--are compared by the
22

respondent. The respondent's perception as to the priority placed
on a particular task when compared to another task is solicited.
From this scaling, perceptions of Role Ambiguity and Role Conflict
are obtainable through analysis. [Drogowski , 1983: p. 17]
The Technical Report continues by offering an explanation of how
the task comparison is to be completed by the respondent.
The individual is asked to scale order each of the tasks against
another a total of three cyclic times. The first cycle gathers
respondent perceptions in regards to how the command he is presently
assigned to places priority on the completion of the two compared
tasks. Cycles two and three gather the respondent perceptions once
again but as to how the respondent perceives the United States Navy
places priority on the task completion and how he as a Naval Officer
perceives what the task priority should be. [Drogowski, 1983: p. 18]
It is the forementioned 30 questions (numbered 65 through 94) that
are specifically analyzed within this study [Drogowski, 1983: pp. 56-61]
It is possible to extract questions other than these for analyses in
the area of role conflict and role ambiguity, but no others were ex-
tracted for this purpose at this time. In order to complete analysis
on the selected questions, it was found to be time saving to extract
the entire Data Bank, together with the program written for analysis,
as described in the Technical Report. The data remained unchanged in
form and content during the analysis process within this study. The
computer program was modified to analyze only the responses to the 30
particular questions, plus questions 1 through 11 which deal in the
area of demographics. Chapter IV which follows, describes the modifi-
cation of the program for the current analysis.
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IV. PROGRAM FOR ANALYSIS
This chapter describes the program used to analyze only those
responses to questions 1 to 11 and 65 to 94 of the data generated from
the pretest of the survey completed by Drogowski [1983] in the area of
Individual Tactical Development. The program was written to interface
with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
A. PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAM
The computer program in Appendix "A" was written with the intent of
analyzing only responses to questions 1 to 11, dealing with demographics,
as well as 65 to 94, which deal with the comparison of the five tasks
described earlier. A brief overview of these five tasks, as well as a
review of instructions presented to the individual completing the
survey (including definitions offered for clarity and common under-
standing), have been extracted from the Technical Report, Appendix "C",
and appear here in Tables I and II.
B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The program (Appendix "A"), was created by modifying the orginal
program, described in the Technical Report, as Appendix "D". This
program consists of four functional parts, which are executed in the
following sequence:
















a) Read Input Data
4. Task-Definition Cards
a) Condescriptive
The program begins with the DATA LIST and INPUT MEDIUM cards. The
functions of these cards remain unchanged from the original program.
Recode instructions are used to convert the alphanumeric value labels
('A 1 to 'E') of CPCTGA (Command Perception, Comparison Tactics versus
General Admin) to IPCSTKOP (Individual Perception, Comparison System
Technical Knowledge versus Officer Professional Qualifications) into
positive or negative single-digit integers. Additional Recode instruc-
tions are given by the use of a second RECODE card. This card recodes
the assigned missing value label previously in alphanumeric form to a
numeric value. Later in the program, the newly assigned missing values
are deleted from the computations. The end result consists of the
means and variances of variables used to describe the individual's
perception of Command, Navy, and Individual task priority.
COMMENT cards are provided with each COMPUTE card to fulfill two
purposes. The first is to enhance the readability of the program for
25

the user, and the second is to document the variable being generated as
a result of the mathematical computation which follows in the related
COMPUTE card. By first setting each task value equal to zero and then
by completing, simple mathematical computations, the task-value mean,
variance, range, sum, standard deviation, standard error, kurtosis,
minimum value, maximum value, and skewness are derivable from the task-
comparison data.
Variable Labels (VAR LABELS) and Value Labels are incorporated
in the program to enhance clarity and understanding of the printed out-
put. Missing values in the form of alphanumeric characters are as-
signed to demographic responses that have not been provided by individuals
The use of the final RECODE card and ASSIGN MISSING card prevents the
processing of cases which do not contain a response to a task-comparison
question (Question 65-94). It should be noted that a Frequency Distri-
bution and Histogram Plot were obtained prior to any recoding of varia-
bles. Data is stored externally to the program, which accesses it from
its external storage location.
After the program was found to be error free, analyses to determine
the existence of role conflict and role ambiguity were performed.







Developing judgmental skills in effective employment of Command
Weapons/Combat Systems.
General Administration
Includes, but is not limited to, Recurring Reports, Correspondence
Instructions, Messages.
Personnel and Navy Program Management
Includes, but is not limited to, all personnel -related Leadership,
Morale, EEO.
requirements and all programs, e.g., Drug, Alcohol.
System Technical Knowledge
Includes, but is not limited to, requirements to be proficient
regarding technical -systems understanding and all maintenance-
systems-related work.
Officer Professional Qualifications
Includes, but is not limited to, Warfare Qualifications, Aircraft






IF YOU PERCEIVE that the task on THE LEFT HAS GREATER NAVY PRIORITY
THAN the task on THE RIGHT, CIRCLE 'A' or 'B'. IF YOU PERCEIVE that
the task on THE RIGHT HAS GREATER NAVY PRIORITY THAN the task on THE
LEFT, CIRCLE 'D' or 'E'. Note that BY CIRCLING 'C YOUR PERCEPTION IS
of EQUAL PRIORITY.
Note that the following scale will be used for the next thirty
questions only.
EXAMPLE
(LEFT TASK) VERSUS (RIGHT TASK)
A — B C D E




V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter describes the results of the statistical analyses
performed. The analyses presented in this chapter specifically deal
only with questions 65 through 94 in the survey questionnaire. The
intent of the analyses was to investigate the existence of possible
role conflict or role ambiguity in the area of individual tactical
development. The intention in this chapter is to focus primarily on
the implications of the responses to these questions.
A. BASIC ANALYSIS
The selected questions were first analyzed by the use of the ori-
ginal program contained in the Technical Report [Drogowski , 1983] to
determine if inappropriate variables existed within the data set. None
were found. The next attempt at analysis used the program discussed in
Chapter Four and presented in Appendix "A" to determine the frequency
distribution of the responses to each question. Examination of the
frequency distributions indicates that each question analyzed was
answered by nearly all of the 286 individuals. These individuals had
met the acceptance criteria for inclusion into the data set as discussed
in the Technical Report. The least favorable questions of the 30 selec-
ted for analyses in the area of role conflict and role ambiguity were
questions numbered 87 through 89. These three questions contained
three missing cases each and 283 valid cases. Since the ratio of
missing cases to valid cases is extremely small, the decision was made
to include the three questions and to continue to analyze the 30
questions rather than just 27. The frequency distributions tend to
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show a fairly uneven distribution of responses towards one task or
another. This uneven distribution was considered to be favorable
towards further analysis.
Results of the frequency-distribution analysis included Absolute
Frequency Count, Relative Frequency Percent, Adjusted Frequency Percent,
and Cumulative Frequency Percent separately for perceived Self, Command,
and Navy evaluations. Observation of the frequency distributions
obtained are included in Appendix "B".
Following the basic frequency-distribution analyses, histograms of
the 30 questions were generated. The histograms make clear that the
different tasks vary in perceived priority. Descriptive statistics
were computed and are included with each histogram in Appendix "B".
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, the use of a "Recode" card
in the program used for specific role conflict and role ambiguity
analyses (Appendix A) recodes the five response values of "A" to "E"
from alphanumeric to numeric values. In this recoding, it is obvious
that the response variable "C", which equates to a value of "Equal",
was to be assigned the value of zero (0). It is necessary to determine
the sign of the remaining Likert scale values. Since "A" and "E" were
to indicate "HIGHER" and "D" and "E" indicate "LOWER" for the focal
task, "A" and "B" were assigned positive values, "D" and "E" negative.
The value of the response "A" was thus set at (+2), "B" (+1), "D" (-1),
"E" (-2).
B. DETERMINATION OF MEAN VALUES FOR EACH FOCAL TASK
Means of task differences created by individual perceptions of
Navy, Individual (Self), and Command priorities were computed by use
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of the program in (Appendix A). The actual computations are based on
the following equations, in which b. and b. are scale values for tasks
i and j and b.* is the scale value for task j on a scale that has a
<J
mean of zero for all five tasks:
bj'-fMbj-b,)
where j indicates the focal task and i
indicates the focal task or any other task.
In this equation, (b. - b.) is the difference perceived by an
individual for tasks i and j, e.g., (b. - b.) is equal to +2, +1, 0,
-1, or -2 depending on the individual's response to the item comparing
the two tasks. Table III shows the results from use of this formula.
C. ANALYSES OF COMPUTED MEANS
1. Role Confl ict
The scale values computed by the preceding formula and shown as
means in Table III are obviously unequal. Plotting horizontally the
tasks being compared and vertically the value of the three means for
each task clearly illustrates the existence of role conflict in Indi-
vidual Tactical Development. Table IV, PLOTTED MEANS, illustrates that
the individuals surveyed perceived three distinct priorities for any
one focal task.
Had the computed mean values been equal to each other, then it
could have been said that role conflict does not exist however this is
not the case. Another view can be taken for the determination of the




PRIORITY PERCEPTION OF TASK DIFFERENCES
CREATED BY INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF
NAVY, INDIVIDUAL (SELF), AND COMMAND PRIORITY,
WITH ASSOCIATED MEAN VALUES.
Navy Priority (Perception)
1 Personnel and Navy Program Management
2 General Admin
3 Officer Professional Qualifications




2 System Technical Knowledge
3 Officer Professional Qualifications
4 Personnel and Navy Program Management
5 General Admin
Individual (Self) Priority (Perception)
1 Tactics
2 System Technical Knowledge
3 Officer Professional Qualifications
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values was completed. By placing the tasks in a list according to
increasing or decreasing mean values for each of the three different
view points (Self, Command, Navy), the existence of role conflict can
be determined.
Table V illustrates that the rank order of Task Means are different
for Navy compared with Command, and for Navy compared with Individual
(Self), but are the same for Command and Individual. Herein lie the
seeds of role conflict.
The data for the sample of 286 Naval Aviators clearly supports the
existence of role conflict between the Navy and its Commands and their
personn el in the area of Individual Tactical Development.
By use of the derived rank-order comparisons listed in Table V,
Kendall's Tau was computed. Results, illustrated in Table VI, are the
Tau coefficients of rank-order correlation. Notice that the coefficient
for Command and Individual (Self) is equal to 1.00. This means that no
role conflict between the two exists for the officers surveyed. However,
when comparing the coefficients of rank correlation of Navy with Command,
and Navy with Individual (Self), we observe that they are both equal
to -.80. This result indicates that role conflict does exist between
Navy and Command and between Navy and Individual within the Air Warfare
Communities .
It must be stated that this data set does not allow for the conclu-
sion to be drawn that role conflict exists throughout the entire Navy.
This is because the survey has been used as a pretest vehicle and does
not solicit responses from individuals outside of the Aviation Commu-
nity. It must also be stated that this study makes two very important
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it is assumed that all individuals with the designators 1310, 1315,
1320, and 1325 perceive task priority the same. Previous research has
shown this not to be the case at all times [Morrison, 1983]. The
second assumption is that all the various aviation communities perceive
the defined tasks the same. Data from all these communities were com-
bined in this study as were the data from all designator groups. Had
questions 65 through 94 been analyzed of separately for the different
groups according to the demographic information obtained, the overall
samples would have been unsatisfactorily small.
A summary statement of the results within the area of role conflict
is that the individuals comprising the sample clearly indicated that
ROLE CONFLICT DOES NOT ARISE from differences BETWEEN COMMANDS AND
INDIVIDUAL (SELF) but DOES ARISE from differences BETWEEN NAVY AND
INDIVIDUAL (Self) AND BETWEEN NAVY AND COMMAND. SAMPLED INDIVIDUALS
PERCEIVE THAT THE NAVY PLACES GREATEST PRIORITY ON PERSONNEL AND NAVY-
RELATED PROGRAMS MANAGEMENT (grand mean of +0.197) and LEAST PRIORITY
ON TACTICS (-0.165). INDIVIDUAL COMMAND AND THE INDIVIDUAL (SELF)
PERCEIVE TACTICS AS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TASK (+0.119, +0.528) and
GENERAL ADMIN AS THE LEAST IMPORTANT (-0.139, -0.650) during the present
peace-time environment.
Navy priorities appear to be polar opposites of the Individual
(Self) and Command priorities. It is interesting to note that the
distance between the plotted means of Command and Individual (Self)
are on the order of four to six times the magnitude of the distances
between the plotted means of Command and Navy. This phenomenon may be
explained in the following way. The individual has greater daily
contact with his individual command than he does with the Navy (Higher
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authority). The author believes that daily contact, close communica-
tions, and loyalty to unit or command influences this identity of pri-
orities. THE STRONGEST SOURCES OF ROLE CONFLICT APPEAR TO EXIST IN
THE AREA OF TACTICS AND THE LEAST IN OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Additional analyses should be completed to determine the extent of role
conflict within each specific rank. Role conflict leads to stress and
frustration. It would appear that the Navy (in general) has some very
frustrated air warfare officers in operational billets.
The following are quotes taken from specific comments received from
individuals surveyed and have been extracted from the companion Tech-
nical Report [Drogowski , 1983].
Naval officers would have more time to develop their primary warfare
skills if the Navy would reduce the massive paperwork/inspection/etc.
requirements that consume an inordinate amount of our time. We
should be more concerend about developing our operational readiness
posture for conducting war and maintaining the peace. At times we
lose sight of our priorities and instead bury and burden ourselves
with paperwork. (0-4, Ship, ASW Module Watch Officer.) [Drogowski,
1983: Appendix "I"]
The tactical competency of the average Naval Officer is appal ing.
Due to the extreme administrative workload, officers are not allowed
time to seek tactical knowledge, nor are they encouraged to pursue
an active tactical training program. Until the Navy reduces the
administrative burden, and stresses tactical expertise vice mana-
gerial skills as the primary driving force for promotion and prefer-
ential orders, the Navy will continue to lag behind our allies in
tactical competence. We may have the best equipment, technical
knowledge, and weaponry, but we have the worst tactical minds.
(0-4, Ship, ASST Air OPS/Training Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983:
Appendix "I"]
I would like to see more time spent on tactics and training. I.E.
more flight/simulator time. Less time spend on administrative B.S.
(0-4, Air Squadron, Division Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix
"I"]
In a single seat A/C squadron; so much time is required in adminis-
trative routine, discipline and various programs management that it
precludes time for even the most routine professional reading. (0-5,
Air Squadron, X0.) [Drogowski, 1983: Appendix "I"]
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The biggest problem with tactical study is the time required to
accomplish our 'desk' jobs. The paperwork level required by the
Navy is overwhelming. (0-3, Air Squadron, Pilot/Personnel Officer.)
[Drogowski , 1983: Appendix "I"]
My particular command places importance on tactics development and
employment. (0-4, Air Squadron, Safety Officer.) [Drogowski, 1983:
Appendix "I"]
D. THE QUESTION OF ROLE AMBIGUITY
A level of role ambiguity, illustrated in Table VII, was computed
by determining the mean of the three variances for each focal task.
The following equation was used for this purpose:
1
3
RAL = i ^ V .
J*
J
where V. is the variance associated with Task
w
j and RAL is the level of role ambiguity.
The mean variances of individual perceptions of Navy, Individual
(Self), and Command priorities illustrated in Table VII indicate the
existence of varying amounts of role ambiguity for the five different
tasks examined in this study. As shown in Table VII, Tactics was the
area of greatest role ambiguity, while Officer Professional Qualifi-
cations was the least role-ambiguous task area .
Role ambiguity may lead to difficulty in performing well on the
related tasks involved. It appears that Air Warfare Officers perceive
their task to achieve Officer Professional Qualifications more clearly
than task achievement in the performance and development of tactics.
Tactics as a task is ambiguously defined, and this ambiguity restricts




LEVELS OF ROLE AMBIGUITY
Role ambiguity level for:
Tactics (+0.437)
Role ambiguity level for:
General Admi
n
( +0 . 342
)
Role ambiguity level for:
Personnel and Navy Related Programs (+0.283)
Role ambiguity level for:
System Technical Knowledge (+0.212)
Role ambiguity level for:




DATA LIST FIXED(7)/1 GRADE 6 (A) DESIG 3 (A) COAST 10 (A)
CO MM 12 (A) JOB 14 (A) TJOE 16 (A) IMVOL 10 (A)
ACSER 20 (A) CUFEM 22 (A) PERSEADU 2a (A) GPFOF 26 (A)
/2 CFCTGA 6 6 (A)
CPCIPNFM 68 (A) CPCTSTK 70 (A) CPCTOPO 72 (A)
/3 CFCGAPNP 6 (A) CPCGASTK 8 (A) Z?CG t\QiQ 10 (A)
CFCFNPST 12 (A) CFCPNPOF 14 (A) CPCSIKOP 16 (A)
NPCTGA 18 (A) NFCTPHPM 20 (A) NPCTSTK 22 (A) MPCTOPQ 24
(A) NFCGAPN? 26 (A) NPCGASTK 28 (A) NPCGAOPQ 30 (A)
NFCFNPST 32 (A) NFCPNFO? 31 (A) NPCSTKOP 36 (A)
IFCTGA 33 (A) IPCTPNPM 40 (A) IPCTSTK 42 (A) IPCTOPQ 4 4
(A) IPCGAPNP 46 (A) IPCGASTK 4b (A) IPCGAOPQ 50 (A)
IFCENPST 52 (A) IPCPNPO? 54 (A) IPCSTKOP 5b (A)
INPUT MEDIUM DISK
RECODB CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP (» A % ~2) (' S« = 1 ) ( ' C« =0) (« D • =-1) ( • E' =-2)
RECODE CPCTGA TO IPCSTKOP («S«=-999S9)
COMMENT TC = TACTICS TASK 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE TC = (CPCTGA + CFCTPNPM + CPCTSTK. CPCTOPQ ) / 5
COMMENT GAC = GENERAL ADMIN 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE GAC = (CPCGAPN? CPCGASTK + IPCGAOPQ - CPCTGA ) / 5
COMMENT FNPC = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'COMMAND'
COMMENT MEAN
COMPUTE FHFC = (CPCPNPST + CFCFNPOP - CPCTPNPM - CPCGAPN? ) / 5
COMMENT STKC = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'COMMAND' MEAN
COMPUTE STKC = (CPCSTKOF - CPCTSTK - CPCGASTK - CPCPNPST ) / 5
COMMENT OPQC = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS • COMMAND'
COMMENT MEAN
COMPUTE OPQC = (-CFCTOPC - CPCGAOPQ - CPCPNPOP - CPCSTKOP ) / 5
COMMENT IN = TACTICS TASK 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE IN = (NPCTGA + NPCIPNPM + NFCISTK + NPCTOPQ ) / 5
COMMENT GAN = GENERAL ADMIN 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE GAN = (NPCGAPN? + NPCGASTK + NPCGAOFQ - NPCTGA ) / 5
COMMENT FNPN = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'NAVY' MEAN
COMFUTE FNPN = (NPCPNPSI + NPCFNPO? - NPCTPNPM - NPCGAPN? ) / 5
COMMENT STKN = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE STKN = (NPCSTKOP - NPCTSTK - NPCGASTK - NPCPNPST ) / 5
COMMENT OPCN = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 'NAVY' MEAN
COMPUTE OPQN = (-HPCTOPQ - HPCGAOPQ - NFCPNPOP - NPCSTKOP ) / 5
COMMENT TI = TACTICS TASK 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE TI = (IFCTGA * IFCTPNPM + IPCTSTK + IPCTOPQ ) / 5
COMMENT GAI = GENERAL ADMIN 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE GAI = (IPCGAPNP + IPCGASTK + IPCGAOPQ - IPCTGA ) / 5
COMMENT FNPI = PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 'INDIVIDUAL'
COMMENT MEAN
COMPUTE FNPI = (IPCPNPST + IPCFNPO? - IPCTPNPM - IPCGAPNP ) / 5
COMMENT STKI = SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 'INDIVIDUAL' MEAN
COMPUTE STKI = (IPCSTKOF - IPCTSTK - IPCGASTK - IPCPNPST ) / 5
COMMENT OPQI = OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 'INDIVIDUAL'
COMMENT MEAN




COMMENT THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM DEFINES THE
COMMENT VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS ONE (1) TO TWELVE (12)
COMMENT SECTION I (BACKGROUND DATA)
COMMENT CUESTICNS THIS SECTION 1-17
COMMENT QUESTION 1-17
VAR LABELS




JOB, PRESENT JOB OR EILLST ASSIGNED/
TJOB, TIME IN PRESENT JOB OR BILLET/
INVCI, COMMANDS MOST RECENT INVOLVEMENT/
fiCSER, TIME IN ACTIVE SERVICE/
CUREM, COMMANDS CURRENT EMPLOYMENT/
PERSEADU, PERCENT SEA DUTY/




COMMENT THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM DEFINES THE
COMMENT VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS SIXTY FIVE (65) TO
COMMENTS SEVENTY-FOUR (74).
VAF. LABELS CPCTGA, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
COMPARISON OF TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN/
CPCTFNFM, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PEI05ITY.
COMPAEISION OF TACTICS VERSUS PERSONNEL AND
NAVY FROG RAM MANAGEMENT/
CPCTSTK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
CCMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TECSICAL
KNOWLEDGE/
CFCTCPQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
COMPAEISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
FESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
CFCGAPNP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
CCMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/
CPCGASIK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION CF COMMAND PRIORITY.
COMPARISIOH OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
CPCGAOFQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PPIORITY,
COMPAEISION CF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
CPCPNPST, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
COMPARISICN OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
CFCFNPOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,
CCMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS/
CPCSTKOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF COMMAND PRIORITY,





COMMENT THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM DEFINES THE
COMMENT VARIABLES USED II! QUESTIONS SEVENTY FIVE (75) TO
COMMENTS EIGHTY-FOUR (84).
VAH LABELS NPCTGA, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COMPARISON OF TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN/
NPCTFNPM, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS PERSONNEL AND
NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/
NPCTSTK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TECNICAL
KNOWLEDGE/
NFCTOPQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COHPABISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
FESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
NPCGAPNP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
CCMPAEISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/
NPCGASTK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
NPCGAOFQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
NPCPNPST, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
NPCPNPOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY.
COMPARISION Or PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS/
NPCSTKOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF NAVY PRIORITY,





COMMENT THE FOLLOWING SECTION OF THIS PROGRAM DEFINES THE
COMMENT VARIABLES USED IN QUESTIONS EIGHTY FIVE (85) TO
COMMENTS NINETY-FOUR (94).
VAB LABELS IPCTGA, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISON OF TACTICS VERSUS GENERAL ADMIN'/
IPCTFNFM, INDIVIDUALS 1 PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF IACTICS VERSOS PERSONNEL AND
NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/
IPCTSTK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
CCMPARISICN OF TACTICS VERSUS SYSTEM TZCNICAL
KNOHLEEGS/
IFCTOPQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF TACTICS VERSUS OFFICER PRO-
FESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
IPCGAPNP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPAFISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS PERSONNEL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT/
IPCGASIK, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
IPCGAOPQ, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COHPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN VERSUS OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS/
IPCPNPST, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROG^A.""
MANAGEMENT VERSUS SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE/
IPCPNPOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT VERSUS OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS/
IPCSTKOP, INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIORITY,
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PREDEPLOY 'rJRKUP NOT DEPLOY OR OVERHL
PREDEPLOY HRKUP AND DEPLOY BUT NOT OVERHL
PREDSFLGY WRKUP, DEPLOY AND OVERHL
DEPLOY BUT NOT OVERHL AND PREDEPLOY WBKUP
DEPLOY AND OVERHL BUT NOT PREDEPLOY WP.KilE
OVSRHL BUT NOT PREDEPLOY WRKU? AND DEPLOY
OVERHL AND PREDEPLOY WRKU? 3UT HOT DEPLOY
POSTDEFLOY TRAIN CYCLE




























































LESS THAN 5 YEARS
> OR EQUAL TO 5 YEARS
> OR ECUAL TO
> OR EQUAL TO
> OR EQUAL TO
> OR EQUAL TC
< 10 YEARS
10 YEARS < 15 YEARS
15 YEARS < 20 YEARS




DEPLOY '.."ORKUP < 3 MONTHS 3EFORE DEPLOYMENT
DEPLOY WORKUP > 3 MONTHS < 1 YEAR
DEPLOYMENT WORKUP > 1 YEAR
SHIPHARD OVERHAUL
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0-6 B 4 1.4 1.4 1.4
0-5 C 59 20.6 20.7 22.1
0-4 D 137 47.9 48.1 70.2
0-3 E 85 29.7 29.8 100.0
k 1 0.3 Missing 100.0
Total 286 100.0 100.0
Valid C ases 285 M:Lssing Cases 1
NOTE
Although the rank of Captain (0-6) was suppressed from
the sample selection, it is assumed that the four indivi-
duals returning the survey indicating their rank of






Category Ab!solute Frequency Frequency Frequency
Label Code Fr<squency Percent Percent Percent
1310 E 175 61.2 61.2 61.2
1315 F 18 6.3 6.3 67.5
1320 G 90 31.5 31.5 99.0
1325 H 3 1.0 1.0 100.0
Total 286 100.0 100.0






Category At>:solute Frequency Frequency Frequency
Label Code Frequency Percent Percent Percent
Atlantic A 139 48.6 48.8 48.8
Pacific B 146 51.0 51.2 100.0
k 1 0.3 Missing 100.0
Total 286 100.0 100.0
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CPCTGA Individual's perception of Command Priority.
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A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = E q u 3 1
D = Higher
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CPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Command Priority*




























E = Significantly Higher
Mean
Variance
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CPCTSTK Individual's perception of Command Priority*
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CPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Command Priority*
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus OFFICER-
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.
CODE
A ****** (20) (Tactics)
'ic**************** (67)
****************************** (H7)
**** (16) Officer Professional Qualifications)





A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = E a u a 1
D = Higher
E = Significantly Higher
Mean
Variance
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CPCGAF'NP Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNEL!.
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
CODE
A ******* (11) (General Admin)
r, - w -^ ^l, -^ .^ ^U .
.^ -,^ J / 'X^ \Xr "^ -^ "Af ^ s^ >^r *^ 'Xr 'A/ -^ "jL" 'X/ "^ .b A/ -^ %J^ ^ X' SU -.y V
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-^ i^. -^
-^ ^ .^ ^ -^ ,^ -,^. -^ .^ .^ ^ ^ ^ ^ -^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ jj ^ -^ -^ \b -.y X> -if i 'V J/ -V '-^/ '4/ 'V ""^ ^ '^ 4 t 'V V V ^ O O \
E ***** (8) (Personnel and Navy Program Management)
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CF'CGASTK Individual's perception of Command Priority.




***** (14) (General Admin)
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CPCGAOPQ Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus OFFICER
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.
CODE
A **** (11) (General Admin)
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A = Significantly Hisher
B = Higher
C = Eo.ua 1
D = Hisher
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CPCPNPST Individual's perception of Command Priority,
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOULEDGE.
CODE
A * * * * (12) (Personnel and Navy Program Management)
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CPCPNPOP Individual's perception of Command Priority*
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS.
CODE
A ***** (8) (Personnel 3nd Navy Program Management)
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CPCSTKOP Individual's perception of Command Priority.
COMPARISION OF SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE versus
OFFICER PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS.
CODE
A *** (8) (System Technical Knowledge)
D
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A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
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D = Higher
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NPCTGA Individual's perception of Navy Priority* t
COMPARISON OF TACTICS versus GENERAL ADMIN.
CODE
A ******* (23) TACTICS
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A = Significantly Higher
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NPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Navy Priority*
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus PERSONNEL AND
NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
CODE
A **** (10) (Tactics)
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^S ^r J^ ^P *^ ^r ^S ^r ^P ^S ^P ^P T^ ^P ^P \ Cj J- /
V '^' "V ^ ^ "^ t fr ^ ""fr ^ V '^ '^ "^ 4 '^ "'A' -V ^ V '-V *^ ""fr ^ ^ '"fr ^V ^ H^ V "t »' i O O \
******* (28) (Personnel and Navy Program Mangt.)
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A = Significantly Higher
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NPCTSTK Individual's perception of Navy Priority*
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus SYSTEMCAL
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.
CODE





-t- ^ ^ ^ ^ -^^^^^^^^^^^^ \ y 1 }
** (7) (System Technical Knowledge)
...i.»»».....i».»»».»»».i.»»...»..»i..»....»».L























































































































































H CO CM m CO CO o
CM H CM 00 m o o

































G -C d r-> G
hfl bfl G bfl bfl
•H •H cr •H •H

































NPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Navy Priority




A *** (6) ( Tactics )
#. if. f. + 4. % % % % % % %. % % if. ( <£> 1 )
iL 'k iC it i i ~jk it it 4' it i £ & it Ac it M Jt if i if ^ ( V ^ 1
:**** <16) Officer Professional Qualifications)
»»». l»...»...»l».....»..l»»»».»»».l.».«»».t.i





















M i n i mu m
Std Deviation
Skewness

















P 0) 0) m l> o rH o O
05 G o
!-H CT u CO CO o CO o o
3 CD CD CM CD 05 o o





0) G C bfl
P CD CD m CM CO rH 05 G o
03 G O H •
3 C? Fh CO CO CO CO CO CO o
•i-5 CD 0) CM CO CO CO o







































> o3 SH a
T3 s -a




























m rH CM o 00 CO o
CO CO CO CO CO o o



















C rH w HH
h0 Q)

















G JG 03 A G
bfl tc G bJD bfl
•H •H cr •H •H



























NPCGAPNP Individual's perception of Navy Priority*
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNELL
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
CODE
I
**** (10) (General Admin)
B-X, \^ Ju sk/ -^ \U Af -dj ^ \ir i- JL -if \^ -^ ±j X- -1/ / : \
.fi -^ T- -fL + fi /f. /fi /f . .^. * ^. ^ ^.
-f . <+. /^ -J. V OO /
^ ^ ^ '•4' "i' 'V '^ "-^ 'V 'V '-V i' ^ 'A' 41 "^ 't1 i/ -to '-to ' V "V '^ '-t' / (3 ^~* " i























































































































































































O rH w n
bfl CD
CD Si >> >>p ci rH rH











G £ crj Jfl G
bfl bfl 3 bfl bfl
•H •H O* •H •H



































NPCGASTK Individual's perception of Navy Priority.
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus SYSTEM
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.
CODE
****** (18) (General Admin)
*************************** ( 106)
************* (52)
i^ *^ ^^ *^ «^ i^ ^p i^ /^ ^^ y^ i^ *^ <^ J^k *^ *^ *^ /^ <^v j^ J^ J^ /^ j^ i^ "^ J^ '^f .*. /
** (7) (System Technical Knowledge)
».»».»<»»1«».»». ...I.. .......1.........1.........1




285 Missing Cases 1






























P CD V CO LO <tf 00 o o
d G O
rH cr Fh lO CO rH CO o o
G CD CD CO CD o o o





cd G G bCp CD a CO CM OS "* CM G o
CO 3 o •H •
G o< H LO rH <tfl lO CO CO o
f-3 CD CD CO CM CO CO o





















































































CM rH 00 CO r-i CO O
lO rH <# LO CO O O



























tH H H tHH CD rH CD •H
G JG «j £3 G
aO CJ3 G QJD bfl
•H •H G< •H •H




























NF'CGAOPQ Individual's perception of Navy Priority.




***** (15) (General Admin)
E *
^^ j^ t^ ^^ /^ <x^ *^ ^p ^p ^^ ^p <^ •( ^p ^n '^ ^^ ^^ *^ *^ *^ ^^ ^^ \ cj 7 /
** (9) Officer Professional Qualifications)









E = Significantly His=her
Mean
Variance






















































































































































































o a> co »* CO CO o
c^ O l> CM CM o o
CO CM CM o
H
















u •H •HH X P
bD
P >) >»p d 1—
*
H













fl X! d £ fl
bfi bfl fl bfl bD
•H H a< •H •H
























NPCPNPST Individual's perception of Navy Priority*
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE.
CODE
A ****** (20) (Personnel and Navy Program Management)
***************************** (114)
******************** (79)
j^ *^ i^ ^^ ^^ j^ ^^ *^ j^ ^^ *^ /^ ^k *^ <^ /^ f^ > p *^ /
*** (8) (System Technical Knowledge)
iitt))iiiliit<ittitliitittiiil>iiii<i>iiiiiiiiiiii




















































































































d O G d
G CO CD O
-c •H £ H
•H H CD tH
> d bfi •H
•H ft Bj r-i
T3 S G d































05 m rH t> «* CO o
r^ 05 O CM CM o o











O H SI a
bfl
CD ,£2 >> >•p d 1—
1
iH








«H H M =H
•H CD l—l CD •H
G xi d xs G
fafl bO G b£) bO
•H •H o1 •H •H




































NPCPNPQP Individual's perception of Navy Priority*
COMPARISION OF PERSONNEL AND NAVY PROGRAMS
MANAGEMENT versus OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS.
CODE
A ***** (14) (Personnel arid Navy Program Management)
•±f i^U . W -l^ . I, .^ -^ ±f . tf .. «, -,»-. -^ .J^ ^ .^ -X, ^ Li \fy v^ \L- ^ -i, -^ vXf - ^- ly - |
,
1 "1 "7 ]
E *
^ *^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ .^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ <^\ ^ \ Q Q ^
** (7) Officer Professional Qualifications)
»»..»»». .l».»....»»l»..«..».«x»»...»..»J.»»«.»».t»l





















M i n i m u m
Std Deviation





















































t> c^ «* CO m
H o•
o o t> H CM CQ o






















































































t> CO CM t> <tf CO o
o t> t> H CM o o




















(D £2 >> >>
P d rH i—l






«H *H Ph «H
•H r—i •H
fl P d P S3
b£ bfl 3 bJD bJD
•H •H O* •H •H

























NF'CSTKOP Individual's perception of Navy Priority.

























































P CD CD -* t> rH CO O o
d G O
rH O1 Fh cs 00 co X o o
3 CD <D CO 00 05 05 o o




CD G G bJD
P 0) CD >* CO <# lO "* G o
W G O •H •
G O* Ph 05 Q t> CM H CQ o
•i-) CD CD CO Tf CQ o






•fc •H CD CD CM o co Tf «tf t> O
>> -P G O
-p d o< b 05 05 t> CM rH O o
•H rH CD CD CO rti o
^ CD u a, rH








d rH P G
3 d G CD
T3 Sh rH G CM O rH l> <* CM CO
•H 0) o a1 tH ^ CM oo
> G 03 CD tH H CM
•H 0) 12 ?H
T3 CJ < Pn
gM CO
s rH
«H CQ CD d
O *H 73 P
0) O <! CQ u Q w oa O













r-i a ^ Jh
d o CD CD
3 CO .g £3
T3 -H >> bfl OJO
•H ^ ^ •H •H
> d O rH w K
•h a bfl CD
T3 s a £5 >> >>
g o p d rH r—
i












< <H *H U m
o •H CD rH CD •H
Eh G xi Kj £3 G
U fan bfi G bD bfl
a •H •H a* •H •H
t—
i






























IPCTGA Individual's perception of Individual Priority
COMPARISON OF TACTICS versus GENERAL ADMIN.
CODE
A ***************************** (112) (Tactics)
Ti t ^ 'i' 'i 'i' t "t '^ '^ '^ '^ 'i '^ ^ i t "V i if i 'V "V 'V 'Jf i "t t J 'i' ^ ^ k V Jf 'i i { 1 ^ m 'i
***** (21)
** (7)















A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = E aua 1
D = Higher


































cr U CO r-{ <tf 00 O O
G CD CD CM t> CD a o o




CD £3 a bfl
P CD CD cq CM 05 CD iH G o
CO G O •H •
3 o< U CO 00 CM ^ tH CQ o
"-J CD CD CM <# CM CO o
























































































rH Oi [> \a o l> o
CO t> CM <# tH o o



























«H H H «H
•H CD rH CD •H
G £5 d rj G
bC bfl G bo bfl
•H •H o< •H •H


























IPCTPNPM Individual's perception of Individual Priority*




A ****************** (66) (Tactics)
********************************** (137)
*** (13)
* (3) (Personnel and Navy P r o g r a m M a n g t )
>..»».»».1».».»»»»»1.»»..».».1».»».»»».1»».».».»«1





A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = E q u a 1
D = Higher












M i n i iti u iti
Std Deviation
Skewness






































































































































































O rH •t1 B
OX) CD
CD .2 >> >»p cS 1—
1
r-t









G ja d 43 G
on QJD G bfl oflH •H cr •H •H



























IPCTSTK Individual's perception of Individual Priority*
COMPARISION OF TACTICS versus SYSTEM TECHNICAL
KNOWLEDGE.
CODE
***** (15) ( Tactics
)
'If ~k to 'to to to' "to to to to ± to to k to to to to to to k k to to to to to to to to to to \to to 'to to 'to 'to to '^ to 'to 'to 'to f i ~? *-" 'i
**** (13)
* (5) (System Technical Knowledge)
»»».»»»»*l«»»»»».»»i.»».»»»«.i»».»»..».l»»*»»»<.»l































































































































































CM o O CM O o o
LO 01 o CM tH H o




























m H u SH
•H rH •H
G jG d ,G G
bfl fciC 3 bO bfl
•H H O* H •H



























IPCTOPQ Individual's perception of Individual Priority*













-T- '* 'T- T- -T-
-T> ^ -IT T* \ J J /
I
I













E = Significantly Higher
Mean
Variance






























































CD O CD G
•H
O





































































































O rH ffi ffi
fan cd
















<P Sh Sh «H
•H CD r-t CD •H
G £3 cd r* G
bD bD G "5) bflH •H & H •H




































IF'CGAPNP Individual's perception of Individual Priority*
COMPARISION OF GENERAL ADMIN versus PERSONNELS
AND NAVY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT.
CODE
I
*** (7) (General Admin)
B ********* (32)
************************** ( 102)
*** (13) (Personnel and Navy F'rosrsiri Management)





A = Significantly Higher
B = Higher
C = E q u 3 1
D ~ Higher












M i n i m u m
Std Deviation
S k e w n e s s
























































CO 05 <tf ^ C o
• • • • •H •
lO H l> <* CO o













































































o CM 05 j-i CO CO O
rH m rH o ^ O o



















































































IF'CGASTK Individual's perception of Individual Priority.
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IPCPNPOP Individual's perception of Individual Priority,
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